A Black Knight in the Eastern Neighbourhood? Russia and EU Democracy Promotion in Armenia and Moldova. EU Diplomacy Paper No. 7, October 2014 by Del Medico, Nicola

 Department of EU International 














A Black Knight in the Eastern Neighbourhood? 
Russia and EU Democracy Promotion in 
Armenia and Moldova  
 
















© Nicola Del Medico 2014 
 
 
Dijver 11 | BE-8000 Bruges, Belgium | Tel. +32 (0)50 477 251 | Fax +32 (0)50 477 250 | 
E-mail info.ird@coleurope.eu | www.coleurope.eu/ird 
Nicola Del Medico 
2 
About the Author 
Nicola Del Medico is Academic Assistant in the Department of the EU International 
Relations and Diplomacy at the College of Europe in Bruges. He obtained an MA 
from the same Department in 2014 and also holds an MA (2012) and a BA (2010) in 
International Relations from LUISS University in Rome, including an exchange 
semester at MGIMO University in Moscow (2011). Nicola Del Medico has acquired 
previous work experience as a trainee in the Italian Prime Minister’s Office (2013), as 
a Blue Book trainee at the European Commission Representation in Rome (2012-
2013) and as an intern at Italy’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011). This paper is based 
on his Master’s thesis at the College of Europe (Voltaire Promotion), which he wrote 



















Nicola Del Medico, Sieglinde Gstöhl, Enrique Ibáñez Gonzalez, Lucas Maurer, 
Jonatan Thompson, Anna Wardell 
Dijver 11 | BE-8000 Bruges, Belgium | Tel. +32 (0)50 477 251 | Fax +32 (0)50 477 250 | 
E-mail ird.info@coleurope.eu | www.coleurope.eu/ird  
Views expressed in the EU Diplomacy Papers are those of the authors only and do 
not necessarily reflect positions of either the series editors or the College of Europe. 
EU Diplomacy Paper 7/2014 
3 
Abstract 
Europe’s peace and security are challenged by the events taking place in the 
Eastern Partnership region. Amid growing tensions between the European Union 
(EU) and Russia, the fate of countries in the common neighbourhood and their 
progress towards democracy are increasingly at stake. This paper tries to 
understand to what extent Russia is undermining EU democracy promotion in the 
Union’s eastern neighbourhood. By focusing on the cases of Armenia and Moldova, 
EU democracy promotion is analysed in light of the triangular relationship between 
the countries under scrutiny, the EU and Russia. It argues that domestic conditions 
and external pressures, linked through the filter of problems of ‘stateness’, are both 
crucial and mutually reinforcing for democratisation. The paper shows that Russia 
can undermine EU democracy promotion to the extent that it strengthens the 








“Encouraging economic and political reform […] cannot 
substitute for a serious effort to counter Russia's long-standing 
expansionism and its present desire to recapture its great-
power status at the expense of its neighbors.”1  
 
When the European Union (EU) launched its Eastern Partnership (EaP) in 2009, the 
project was supposed to bring democracy, stability and security to the post-Soviet 
countries it targeted. The current outcome is stalling reforms, growing instability and 
violence. The emergence of tensions in the EaP area coincided with the return of 
Russia as a power with regional and global ambitions. Through the Russian-led 
Customs Union (CU) and the planned Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), Moscow has 
actively advocated for the re-launch of regional integration plans in the post-Soviet 
space, including countries that are involved in the Union’s European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The rising confrontation between two competing 
models of regional integration combines with growing insecurity and the lack of 
progress in democratisation in the EaP area. 
This paper aims to shed light on EU democracy promotion in the eastern 
neighbourhood and to evaluate the impact of Russia’s proactive regional and 
foreign policy in this regard. Specifically, it focuses on the cases of Armenia and 
Moldova. The two countries are both located in Russia’s and the EU’s common 
neighbourhood, they are confronted with ‘frozen conflicts’ – respectively in 
Nagorno-Karabakh and in Transnistria – and have been targets of EU democracy 
promotion. However, they have made different choices in both their domestic and 
foreign policies. Based on the two case studies, this paper aims to give an answer to 
a crucial and topical question: to what extent is Russia undermining EU democracy 
promotion in the eastern neighbourhood? 
I argue that EU democracy promotion in the eastern neighbourhood is shaped by a 
triangular relationship between the EaP country, the EU and Russia, whereby the 
country under scrutiny is not a mere object but an active and decisive subject. The 
form and impact of EU democracy promotion depend on the mutually reinforcing 
blend of the objectives pursued by the third country and the influence exerted by 
both the EU and Russia. Specifically, concerns related to national security and 
                                                 
1 Y. Tymoshenko, “Containing Russia”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 86, no. 3, 2007,  p. 70. 
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contested statehood in Armenia and Moldova have given rise to diverging 
attitudes towards EU democracy promotion. 
The following section introduces the theoretical concepts and tools relevant for the 
analysis. The paper then examines the Armenian and Moldovan cases by focusing 
on three levels of analysis – the domestic structures, the EU’s and Russia’s policies – 
in order to draw conclusions on the triangular set of relations influencing EU 
democracy promotion. 
 
Conceptualising EU democracy promotion in the EaP 
The existing literature on EU democracy promotion in the post-Soviet space offers 
important suggestions on the triangular relationship between the domestic context 
of EaP countries, the EU and Russia. However, the connections between these three 
sets of factors, and the corresponding levels of analysis, are left underexplored. 
As far as the domestic structures are concerned, their centrality in determining the 
success of democratisation is emphasised by Sasse,2 as well as by Tolstrup, who 
conceives the domestic ruling actors as “gatekeepers”3 that are able to upgrade or 
downgrade the external pressure for democratisation. 
With regard to the EU’s policies – the second variable – Lavenex and 
Schimmelfennig offer a categorisation of the modes of EU democracy promotion: 
leverage, linkage and governance. 4  Leverage refers to a top-down model of 
democracy promotion targeting foreign governments, typically by means of 
political conditionality; linkage denotes transnational exchanges (for instance in civil 
society or in the economic field); and governance involves sectoral trans-
governmental cooperation, leading to the adoption of transparent, accountable 
and participatory rules in administrative practices.5 According to the authors, the 
ENP is characterised by governance, as the absence of a membership perspective 
for its neighbours reduces the Union’s possibilities to successfully resort to leverage. 
However, an important caveat is that effective external democratic governance 
may not necessarily lead to democratisation because sectoral and administrative 
                                                 
2 G. Sasse, “Linkages and the promotion of democracy: the EU's eastern neighbourhood”, 
Democratization, vol. 20, no. 4, 2013, p. 553. 
3 J. Tolstrup, “When can external actors influence democratization? Leverage, linkages, and 
gatekeeper elites”, Democratization, vol. 20, no. 4, 2013, pp. 716-742. 
4 S. Lavenex & F. Schimmelfennig, “EU democracy promotion in the neighbourhood: from 
leverage to governance?”, Democratization, vol. 18, no. 4, 2011, pp. 885-909. 
6 Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, op. cit., p. 896. 
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reforms may well coexist with overall non-democratic institutions.6 Moreover, the 
main focus of these conceptualisations are the EU and its institutions as 
disseminators of democratisation, thus losing sight of the role played in the process 
by the domestic structures.7 Hence, there is a need to look in more depth at the 
links between internal and external factors when examining the promotion of 
democracy by the EU. 
Way and Levitsky’s notion of “Western leverage”8 and linkages is relevant to the 
present paper not only for its reference to such links, but also because the authors 
consider the role played by alternative international factors impacting on EU 
democracy promotion – what they call “black knights”,9 that is, competing external 
powers. This notion can be applied to Russia – the third variable in the present study 
– as an actor seeking to project its influence in the post-Soviet space. Sasse and 
Tolstrup investigate Russia’s role and repercussions on democratisation in the 
region.10 These analyses are also helpful in determining how and when the domestic 
political setting activates a triangular interaction impacting on democratisation and 
involving both the EU and Russia as international players. 
Sasse argues that one of the filters producing an interplay between internal and 
external factors are “stateness issues”, 11  that is, unresolved political and ethnic 
conflicts, which have a destabilising potential and concern the very existence of 
the state.12 The inclusion of problems of stateness in the analysis of the domestic 
context is particularly relevant when looking at the cases of Armenia and Moldova, 
whose statehood must deal with ‘frozen conflicts’ in respectively Nagorno-
Karabakh and Transnistria. 
                                                 
6 Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, op. cit., p. 896. 
7 R. Youngs, “Democracy promotion as external governance?”, Journal of European Public 
Policy, vol. 16, no. 6, 2009, pp. 895-915. 
8 L. Way & S. Levitsky, “Linkage, Leverage and the Post-Communist Divide”, East European 
Politics and Societies, vol. 21, no. 1, 2007, pp. 48-66. 
9 G.C. Hufbauer, J.J. Schott & K.A. Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and 
Current Policy, Washington, DC, Institute for International Economics, 1990, p. 12, quoted in 
Way & Levitsky, op. cit., p. 51. 
10 G. Sasse, “Who cares about Transnistria? Linkage and Leverage: External actors and 
conflicts in the post-Soviet space”, Politics In Spires, 24 October 2012; Tolstrup, “Studying a 
negative external actor: Russia's management of stability and instability in the 'Near 
Abroad'”, Democratization, vol. 16, no. 5, 2009, pp. 922-944; Sasse, “Linkages”, op. cit. 
11 Sasse, “Linkages”, op. cit., p. 554. 
12 See also J.J. Linz & A. Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation – 
Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1996, p. 16. 
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Although Sasse’s study focuses on linkages, this paper will take stateness into 
account also in the analysis of the leverage and governance dimensions of EU 
democracy promotion. A focus on this issue in Armenia and Moldova can reveal 
insights on the role of a ‘black knight’ Russia and on the extent to which EU 
democracy promotion is shaped by competing external factors. 
In sum, the variables that guide the present analysis are identified at the intersection 
of international and domestic political factors. In the case of the ENP – and 
specifically of the EaP – EU democracy promotion is shaped by a triangular 
relationship between the third country, the EU and Russia as an alternative pole of 
attraction. These variables are explored by using different sources such as official 
documents, literature and nine semi-structured interviews with officials and experts 
based in Brussels, Chisinau, Paris, and Yerevan. 
 
Armenia’s volte face 
“A ‘captured’ state”13 
Freedom House ranks Armenia as a “semi-consolidated authoritarian regime”.14 The 
country is governed by a strong executive power which supersedes both the 
judiciary and the parliament.15 It faces serious economic difficulties, with nearly one 
third of the population living below the poverty line.16 Armenia’s political, security 
and economic challenges have shaped its participation in the ENP and in the EaP. 
In the Armenian case, Sasse’s notion of ‘stateness’ problems points directly to the 
unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as the major issue affecting the country’s 
state building and security.17 This conflict has impacted significantly on political 
competition in Armenia. On the one hand, restrictions on political liberalisation can 
be explained by the fact that, since the country’s independence, the domestic 
political spectrum has converged around the need to preserve the country’s 
borders and security. Keeping a firm and uncompromising stance vis-à-vis 
                                                 
13 F.L. Altmann, J. Deimel & A. García Schmidt, “Democracy and Good Governance in the 
Black Sea Region”, Commission on the Black Sea Policy Reports, no. 4, 2010, p. 37, quoted in 
N. Mikhelidze, “Juggling Security, Democracy and Development in the Caucasus: What Role 
for the EU?”, IAI Working Papers, vol. 13, no. 22, Rome, IAI, July 2013, p. 5. 
14  Freedom House, “Nations in Transit. Armenia”, 2014, retrieved 15 October 2014, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2014/armenia#.VD4wtdJWG70. 
15 Bertelsmann Stiftung, “Armenia Country Report”, in Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) 
2014, Gütersloh, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014, p. 31;  
16 Ibid., p. 13. 
17 Sasse, “Linkages”, op. cit., pp. 553, 574-576. 
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Azerbaijan became an essential requirement of political credibility, particularly for 
those aspiring to the highest government offices.18 
On the other hand, there is a perception that democratisation can engender 
threats to state security because it can pave the way to cleavages and divisions, 
thus weakening the state and its effective control on borders and territory.19 Hence, 
the unresolved nature of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict reinforced the 
centralisation of power in Armenia.20 According to an Armenian expert, incumbent 
governments have exploited the Nagorno-Karabakh issue not only to undermine 
the electoral process but also to suppress recurrent post-election demonstrations.21 
In such cases, the government’s discourse framed the limitations to competition 
and the repression of protests as dictated by the need to maintain stability and 
unity, for the sake of state security.22 
The prominence of security needs permeated also the country’s economic 
structure and favoured military spending, rather than investments leading to social 
welfare and development.23 In 2010, Yerevan’s military expenditure accounted for 
$395 million or 4.2% of the country’s GDP.24 In the last few years, moves to reduce 
the defence budget were criticised 25  in light of Azerbaijan’s almost thirtyfold 
increase in military spending in the last decade26 – nearly $2.8 billion in 2010 –27 and 
claims that Baku’s military budget is worth as much as Armenia’s GDP.28 In addition, 
Armenia has faced difficulties in international trade and cross-border flows: the 
country is landlocked and it has closed borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan. A “no 
                                                 
18 T. Mkrtchyan, “Democratization and the Conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh”, Turkish Policy 
Quarterly, vol. 6, no. 3, 2007, pp. 6-7. 
19 Mikhelidze, op. cit., p. 8. Mkrtchyan argues against this view and states that the key to 
Armenia’s security and to conflict resolution rests on steady democratisation. See 
Mkrtchyan, op. cit., p. 8. 
20 M.R. Freire & L. Simão, “From words to deeds: European Union democracy promotion in 
Armenia”, East European Politics, vol. 29, no. 2, 2013, p. 181. 
21 Interview with Hrant Kostanyan, Associate Research Fellow, Centre for European Policy 
Studies, Brussels, via Skype, 25 April 2014. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Mikhelidze, op. cit., p. 6. 
24  “Armenia – The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database”, Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI), retrieved 19 October 2014, http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4. 
25  S. Harutyunyan, “Ex-Official Concerned Over Actual Military Budget Cut”, RFE/RL, 7 
October 2009. 
26 Z. Agayev, “Azeri-Russian Arms Trade $4 Billion amid Tension with Armenia”, Bloomberg, 13 
August 2013. 
27 “Azerbaijan – The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database”, Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI), retrieved 17 October 2014, http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4. 
28 A. Eberhardt, “Countries Briefing on Armenia and Azerbaijan”, European Parliament, 12 
June 2012. 
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peace, no war”29 stalemate and unfriendly relations with two of its neighbours have 
had a significant impact on the economy and contributed to make Armenia the 
poorest country in the South Caucasus.30 
Economic hardship went along with concentration of wealth and economic power 
in the hands of few oligarchs, the so-called ‘Karabakh clan’.31 The ‘clan’ includes 
individuals and families that moved to Armenia from Nagorno-Karabakh and seized 
control of key economic sectors by taking advantage of their close relations with 
Karabakh-native political elites.32  
The need to enhance Armenia’s economic development was a major driver 
behind its participation in the ENP and the EaP.33 The reason that led Yerevan to join 
a partnership with the EU was, in the first place, economic integration, coupled with 
an expectation that this, in turn, would result in the lift of the border blockade by 
Turkey.34 The role attributed by the Armenian government to the EU as a provider of 
prosperity and economic opportunities is crucial in examining the Union’s promotion 
of democracy, especially in light of Armenia’s priorities and the country’s foreign 
policy strategy.35 
At the top of the government’s agenda is the preservation of security and a pledge 
to economic development, with democratisation being a second-order aim. 36 
Armenia has transposed the pursuit of these priorities at the level of its foreign policy 
of “complementarity”, 37  whereby the country seeks to carefully balance the 
interaction with external actors that can support the achievement of national 
objectives.38 
                                                 
29 Mkrtchyan, op. cit., p. 5. 
30  “Armenia”, Eastern Partnership Community, 2010, retrieved 26 April 2014, 
http://www.easternpartnership.org/partner-states/armenia. 
31 Freire & Simão, op. cit., p. 180. 
32 M. Duffy Toft, “The irony of Nagorno-Karabakh: formal institutions versus informal politics”, 
in J. Hughes & G. Sasse (eds.), Ethnicity and Territory in the Former Soviet Union: Regions in 
Conflict, New York, Frank Cass, 2002, pp. 155-157. 
33 Freire & Simão, op. cit., p. 183; interview with Kostanyan, op. cit. 
34  “Armenia’s President expects Eastern Partnership to deblockade closed border with 
Turkey”, Armenpress, 25 April 2014, retrieved 26 April 2014, http://armenpress.am/eng/news/ 
759627/armenia’s-president-expects-eastern-partnership-to-deblockade-closed-border-
with-turkey.html. 
35 N. Babayan & N. Shapovalova, “Armenia: the Eastern Partnership’s unrequited suitor”, 
FRIDE Policy Brief, no. 94, Madrid, FRIDE, September 2011. 
36 Mikhelidze, op. cit., pp. 7-8. 
37 Vartan Oskanyan, quoted in Freire & Simão, op. cit., p. 183. 
38  K. DerGhougassian, “Farewell to Complementarity: Armenia’s Foreign Policy at a 
Crossroad”, The Armenian Weekly, 1 April 2014. 
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If seen through the prism of complementarity, Armenia’s relations with the EU are 
based on what the EU is able to offer in economic and security terms, and as a 
complement to the other main external actor, Russia. The EU is Armenia’s first trade 
partner, with a total trade share of 27.9%.39 The incentives of enhanced market 
access and assistance to modernisation offered by the ENP/EaP are therefore 
attractive. On the contrary, as far as security is concerned, the EU’s contribution is 
essentially reduced to the prospect of long-term stabilisation and pacification 
through democratisation.40 
Armenia’s engagement with the EU is hence mostly underpinned by an economic 
and commercial rationale. Accordingly, the adoption and implementation of 
reforms, including political reforms, has followed an instrumental logic. The 
government focused on those EU-promoted reforms that could overall bring 
modernisation and improve administrative and economic performance. On the 
other hand, it resisted more politically sensitive reforms – for instance ensuring the 
independence of the judiciary – that would question the existing power structure.41 
According to Simão, the Armenian government introduced formal rules of political 
liberalisation in order to establish an “imitation of democracy”42 and ensure the flow 
of funding that the EU made conditional on democratic progress. 
In sum, Armenia counted on cooperation with the EU to advance its economic 
aims. It was willing to reform and improve its governance practices and institutions, 
yet not to the extent of jeopardising the prevailing centralised state structures. In this 
sense, the country’s commitment to democratise was half-hearted.  
 
EU democracy promotion in Armenia 
Until the launch of the ENP in 2004, the bulk of cooperation between Brussels and 
Yerevan was mostly centred on technical and sectoral assistance, specifically in 
economic matters.43 Although the 1996 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
                                                 
39 European Commission, “Countries and Regions – Armenia”, DG Trade, 27 August 2014, p. 
9, retrieved 15 October 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/ 
countries/armenia. 
40 Interview with Kostanyan, op. cit.; see also Mkrtchyan, op. cit., p. 8. 
41 Interview with an official, EEAS, Brussels, 3 April 2014. 
42 L. Simão, “The problematic role of EU democracy promotion in Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
Nagorno-Karabakh”, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 45, nos. 1-2, 2012, p. 197. 
43 I. Solonenko and B. Jarabik, “Ukraine”, in R. Youngs (ed.), Is the European Union supporting 
democracy in its Neighbourhood?, Madrid, FRIDE, 2008, op. cit.,  p. 93. 
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(PCA) defined respect for the principle of democracy an “essential element”44 of 
the treaty, political conditionality remained vague.45 
With the ENP, the EU aimed to develop a more solid engagement with its 
neighbours, including in the field of democracy support. The 2006 EU-Armenia 
Action Plan, the non-binding document guiding Armenia’s participation in the 
policy, links the reform and legal approximation process to the attainment of “a 
stake in the EU’s Internal Market” and the gradual participation “in key aspects of 
EU policies and programmes”. 46  Moreover, the EU committed to contribute to 
solving the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, both through supporting the existing 
instruments deployed by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) and, if necessary, by deeper and further engagement.47 
Democracy support figures in the document as the number one priority, involving 
primarily a focus on constitutional reform, the separation of powers, a strengthening 
of rule of law and the judiciary, and the fight against corruption. The Action Plan lists 
also other “general objectives and actions”48 destined to complement the priority 
areas for cooperation, including the empowerment of local self-government, 
pluralism and the party system. However, in spite of the pivotal importance of such 
matters for the emergence of democracy, their attainment has been given only 
complementary relevance.49 Hence, even from a declaratory standpoint, the EU’s 
commitment to promote democracy in Armenia in the framework of the ENP 
exposed a series of shortcomings: the Action Plan did not specify how crucial issues 
like the development of political pluralism would be supported and how the 
distinction between priorities and complementary objectives would translate in 
concrete terms.50 
The limitations of the Action Plan were reproduced in the 2007-2013 Country 
Strategy Paper, that is, the basis for allocating funding and assistance at the country 
                                                 
44  European Union, “Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European 
Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Armenia, of the 
other part”, Official Journal of the European Union, L239, 9 September 1999, Art. 2. 
45 R. Balfour, Human Rights and Democracy in EU Foreign Policy: The cases of Ukraine and 
Egypt, Abingdon, Routledge, 2012, pp. 39-47. 
46 European Commission, EU / Armenia Action Plan, 14 November 2006, p. 2. 
47 Ibid., p. 3. 
48 Ibid., p. 10. 
49 Ibid., pp. 4-5, 10. 
50 N. Ghazaryan, The European Neighbourhood Policy and the Democratic Values of the EU: 
A Legal Analysis, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2014, pp. 131-132. 
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level,51 and the National Indicative Programmes52 (NIP) for 2007-2010 and 2011-
2013, which guided the distribution of funds under the European Neighbourhood 
and Partnership Instrument (ENPI).53 
Hence, although the ENP tried to establish a link between a declaratory 
commitment to the promotion of democracy and effective democracy support, 
the allocation of funds did not prioritise assistance in pivotal areas like political 
pluralism and civil society participation. In addition, while largely drawing on the 
enlargement experience, the incentives proposed by the ENP to favour reforms 
were considerably weaker than the prospect of membership. This reduced the EU’s 
leverage and resulted mainly in the use of positive conditionality (that is, the offer of 
rewards).54 
The launch of the EaP in 2009 partly addressed these shortcomings, notably by 
linking the conclusion of an Association Agreement (AA), a Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) and the visa facilitation process to 
progress on the objectives outlined in the Action Plan, including democracy-related 
reforms. Besides introducing new sources of leverage, the EaP also strengthened the 
linkage dimension of the ENP through regional dialogue initiatives – ranging from 
parliamentary exchanges (EURONEST) and an Eastern Partnership Civil Society 
Forum to a Business Forum and a Conference of Regional and Local Authorities.55 
The establishment in 2012 of the European Endowment for Democracy (EED) further 
signalled the readiness to create linkages with pro-democracy non-state actors in 
the neighbourhood.56 The conditional engagement leading to the conclusion of an 
AA/DCFTA and the parallel intensification of regional linkages was integrated by 
                                                 
51 European Commission, European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. Armenia. 
Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013, 2007, retrieved on 15 October 2014, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/country/enpi_csp_armenia_en.pdf 
52 European Commission, European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. Armenia. 
National Indicative Programme 2007-2010, 2007, retrieved 15 October 2014, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/country/enpi_csp_nip_armenia_en.pdf; European 
Commission, European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. Armenia. National 
Indicative Programme 2011-2013, 2010, retrieved 15 October 2014, http://eeas.europa.eu/ 
enp/pdf/pdf/country/2011_enpi_nip_armenia_en.pdf 
53  The ENPI has been replaced by the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI). See 
European Union, “Regulation (EU) No 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument”, Official 
Journal of the European Union, L77, 15 March 2014, pp. 27-43. 
54 Ghazaryan, op. cit., pp. 131-132. 
55 See H. Kostanyan & B. Vandecasteele “Towards ‘EuroNest 2.0’: What should the next 
European Parliament learn from its predecessor?”, CEPS Policy Briefs, no. 300, 2013. 
56  Council of the European Union, Declaration on the Establishment of a European 
Endowment for Democracy, 18764/1, Brussels, 20 December 2011, p. 4. 
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assistance to reforms in functional and administrative fields, hence relying on the 
governance approach to democracy promotion.57 
After the 2011 revision of the ENP, Armenia received additional funding in 2012 and 
2013 as a reward “for [its] efforts in democratic transition and [its] commitment to 
fundamental values”.58 Nevertheless, such extra funding, assigned under the ‘more 
for more’ logic, was allocated despite the persistent shortcomings in judiciary 
independence, media freedom and minority rights as well as vote manipulation 
and the use of administrative resources for electoral purposes, which were 
acknowledged both by the European Commission and non-governmental 
organisations.59  
When read in conjunction with the allocation of funding under the ENPI and the 
related priority areas, this application of the ‘more for more’ approach indicates 
that, while focusing on important areas like the elections, administrative reform and 
judiciary independence, the EU struggled to tackle additional systemic-level 
measures, notably the enhancement of executive-legislative accountability, 
political liberalisation, freedom of the press and civil rights.60 
Drawing from the conceptualisations of democracy promotion previously outlined, 
the analysis of the EU’s engagement with Armenia points mostly to an instance of 
governance. In spite of the economic and trade incentives it proposed, the EU 
lacked effective leverage to induce overall democratisation in Armenia. Progress in 
the adoption of reforms was limited to specific sectors, while the broader picture 
was overlooked. According to an EU official, the Union has promoted democracy in 
Armenia by “acting in watertight compartments”.61   
When, in September 2013, President Sargsyan announced that Armenia would join 
the CU with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, it appeared as a country “sticking to 
                                                 
57  European Commission, 2007-2010 National Indicative Programme, op. cit.; European 
Commission, 2011-2013 National Indicative Programme, op. cit. 
58 European Commission, Eastern Partnership: progress in deep democracy and human 
rights rewarded with additional funding, IP/13/1245, Brussels, 12 December 2013. 
59  European Commission, ENP Country Progress Report 2013 – Armenia, MEMO/14/220, 
Brussels, 27 March 2014, European Commission, ENP Country Progress Report 2012 – Armenia, 
MEMO/13/242, Brussels, 20 March 2013; “Country analysis – Armenia”, European Integration 
Index for Eastern Partnership Countries, 2013. 
60  H. Kostanyan, “Neither Integrated nor Comprehensive in Substance: Armenia and 
Georgia”, in J. Orbie & A. Wetzel (eds.), The Substance of EU Democracy Promotion. 
Concepts and Cases, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015 (forthcoming). 
61 Interview with official 2, European Parliament, Office for the Promotion of Parliamentary 
Democracy, Brussels, 24 March 2014. 
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the sticks without wanting the carrot”.62 Nonetheless, this decision made clear that 
Armenia’s economic needs, as well as its willingness to reform, were superseded by 
the imperative of protecting national security from the threats originating from 
Nagorno-Karabakh. As acknowledged by an EU diplomat, “the core issue was not 
economic but a security one, related to Nagorno-Karabakh.”63 Interestingly, the 
decision to enter the Eurasian CU followed a sale of weapons worth $1 billion to 
Azerbaijan by Russia.64 
From a security standpoint, what characterises the ENP and the EaP is a long-term 
approach to regional security and conflict resolution, based on cooperation with 
the EU and democratisation. The Union declared its support for the peace 
negotiations carried out under the OSCE auspices.65 However, the EU is not directly 
represented in the so-called OSCE Minsk Group which inter alia comprises several 
EU countries and is co-chaired by France, Russia and the US. Moreover, the 
engagement of the EU Special Representative for the Southern Caucasus with the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was limited.66 An EU official stated that the conflict “has 
been disregarded in dealing with Armenia”.67 He also admitted that the European 
External Action Service (EEAS) was convinced that Armenia could be a sort of 
hybrid model, whereby it could rely on the Russian-centred Collective Security 
Treaty Organisation (CSTO) for hard security. Since the Armenian government knew 
that Russia could not offer much in terms of economic modernisation, this task 
would be conferred upon the EU.68 Hence, EU-Armenia relations, and democracy 
promotion more specifically, had to come to grips with the ‘complementarity’ 
strategy pursued by Armenia, which implied that the priority aim remained the 
avoidance of threats to national security as a result of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict. This situation, based on a ‘complementary’ foreign policy engagement, 
mirrored the triangular relations between Armenia, the Union and Russia, with the 
latter playing the role of a security provider for Armenia. 
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The Russian factor 
As far as Russian-Armenian relations are concerned, Yerevan was included in 
Russian-sponsored, post-Soviet regional policies since the very beginning. The 
country is a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and in 
1992 it was among the founding signatories of the CSTO, the treaty establishing the 
CIS’ security alliance. Interestingly, Armenia’s positioning under the Russian security 
umbrella proceeded along with escalation in Nagorno-Karabakh, hence ensuring 
Moscow’s support in the conduct of military operations against Azerbaijan. 
Armenia’s reliance on Russian military power allowed Moscow to keep a foot in the 
Caucasus region, where it actively engaged in the management of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict, leading the negotiations that brought about a ceasefire in 1994 
and deploying troops to guard the Armenian border.69 The security bond between 
the two countries was sealed by the 1997 Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and 
Mutual Assistance, which established mutual defence obligations and reinforced 
synergies between the foreign policies of the parties.70 
Russian-Armenian relations are not circumscribed to security cooperation. Russia 
maintains an extensive and deep set of linkages with its Caucasian partner, ranging 
from economic activities to energy and forms of ‘soft power’.71 Russia is Armenia’s 
second trade partner, accounting for 24.3% of total trade – which is comparable to 
the EU’s share of 27.9%.72 Following Yerevan’s decision to join the Russian-led CU, 
trade relations with Moscow could intensify, 73 while trade volumes with non-CU 
partners might worsen in light of the expected rise in tariffs that Armenia will 
experience to adjust to CU levels.74 In addition, Russian business holds far-reaching 
control of key Armenian enterprises and monopolies. Russia accounts for more than 
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20% of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Armenia75 and for more than 50% of gross 
capital flows. 76  In the energy sector, Russia owns Armenia’s hydropower and 
nuclear plants, while Gazprom bought the country’s gas monopoly and controls the 
pipeline connecting Armenia with Iran. Russian companies control the 
telecommunications sector and have significant stakes in the infrastructures, while 
the Armenian banking system is also tied to Russia.77 
With regard to the linkages that may be used as levers by Russia, a pivotal source of 
influence is the amount of remittances sent by Armenian migrants from Russia. 
Remittances represent 16% of the country’s GDP, with 89% coming from Russia.78 
Migration issues have been used both in a positive and negative fashion by 
Moscow: on the one hand, Russian authorities can allow for visa free travel, yet on 
the other hand, they can put pressure on Armenian migrant workers, whose 
earnings are essential to Armenia’s economy.79 
The robust economic component in Russia-Armenia relations has influenced also 
domestic political dynamics. The proximity of the country’s political elite to the 
‘clan’ of oligarchs controlling the economy exposes it to Russian interests.80 Coupled 
with the security guarantees offered by Moscow, this translates into a general 
complacency vis-à-vis Russia’s policies and, according to an EU official, it led the 
government to look at Russia as a governance model to restrict political 
competition and liberalisation.81 Russian political influence rests also on the fact that 
the mostly Russian-speaking Armenian population has free access to Russian media. 
According to a representative of Armenia’s press and civil society, Russian television 
channels have been spreading pro-Kremlin messages around the country and 
garnered support for closer integration between Yerevan and Moscow.82 
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In sum, in terms of leverage and linkages, Russia could play the role of a ‘black 
knight’ based on its economic, political and security connections with Armenia. If in 
the economic sphere the EU’s proposed DCFTA and related funding potentially 
provided Brussels with room to exert leverage – also to promote democratic reforms 
– this was not only offset by Russia’s economic stakes but also, and to a larger 
extent, by Moscow’s centrality in preserving the country’s security and stance vis-à-
vis Nagorno-Karabakh. 
Nonetheless, the role of Russia in curbing EU democracy promotion should not be 
overstated, particularly in light of the Armenian government’s limited will to open 
the political space to increased competition. On the one hand, EU democracy 
promotion took the form of governance, thus being in itself of limited impact. On 
the other hand, Russia’s linkages and leverage had the effect of reinforcing, rather 
than engendering, the prevailing domestic aversion for political competition. In line 
with Armenia’s foreign policy strategy of ‘complementarity’, Russia represented a 
source of external support for the government to pursue its own priorities, namely, 
the preservation of security and control over Nagorno-Karabakh. 
 
Moldova, the ‘good pupil’ 
 
“Failed authoritarianism”83 
According to Freedom House, Moldova is a “partially free” 84  country, where 
political competition is coupled with weak state structures, fragile political parties, 
and persistent corruption. When Moldova gained independence from the Soviet 
Union, the outbreak of a conflict with separatist Transnistria diverted much of the 
new country’s efforts away from strengthening its structures and institutions. 85 In 
addition, political parties lacked organisational capacities and solid ideological 
bases, and tended to form unstable coalitions around single personalities.86 The 
result was what Way called “pluralism by default”, 87  a virtual impossibility to 
concentrate power in just one single pole. 
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The diffusion of power was ultimately amplified when in 2000 Moldova became a 
parliamentary republic, which meant that the parliament could enhance its checks 
vis-à-vis the executive and elect the President. This constitutional transformation 
contributed to preserve the country’s political competition even in the 2000s, after 
the well-organised and disciplined Communist Party (PCRM) had come to power in 
2001. Endowed with a solid basis and a strong leadership – in the person of President 
Vladimir Voronin – the PCRM started to exert greater control over Moldovan media 
and state institutions, including the judiciary.88 Nevertheless, the focal point of the 
political system being the parliament, any attempt at authoritarian drifts by the 
executive had to face the power of the legislative and the opposition.89 
The persistence of political competition also ensured that the elections favoured the 
turnover of different political forces in the country’s government. Following the 
contested 2009-2010 series of early elections, the PCRM was ousted from power by 
an opposition coalition, the Alliance for European Integration (AIE), which in turn 
failed to consolidate its power basis in parliament. The coalition suffered from 
defection and it went through a nearly three-year stalemate to elect a new 
President, thus confirming the fragility of Moldova’s democratic institutions.90     
Moldovan “pluralism by default”91 was hence determined by the fragility of political 
parties and a tension between the constitutional powers, above all the executive 
and the legislative, which effectively prevented the emergence of 
authoritarianism.92 According to Way, the competitive nature of the political arena 
can be further explained by the polarisation inherited from the dismantlement of 
the Soviet system,93 which caused the country’s “stateness issues”.94 
The stateness problems with which Moldova is confronted concern two main 
questions: in the first place, there is the ‘frozen’ Transnistrian conflict, which deprived 
Chisinau of control over parts of its territory and has guaranteed Russia a foothold in 
the country, not only through its peacekeeping forces, but also by means of more 
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or less direct support to the de facto Transnistrian government.95 Secondly, and of 
equal importance, the break-up of the Soviet system sparked a debate over 
Moldovan national identity, with parts of the population nurturing pro-Romanian 
aspirations or simply cultural affiliation, and the rest supporting the preservation of a 
separate Moldovan identity and independence. Among this latter portion of the 
population, which includes Russian-speaking groups, are those that are in favour of 
closer engagement with Russia, also in view of maintaining traditional ties to the 
post-Soviet space. On the other hand, besides a minority pushing categorically for 
unification with Romania, a significant share of the population favours a pro-
Western and pro-EU stance.96 
These questions pertaining to statehood and national identity have the potential of 
triggering an entanglement between domestic political debates and international 
actors, notably the EU and Russia. To exemplify this, when the Communist 
government under President Voronin decided to reverse its previous support for 
Eurasian regional integration in favour of engagement with the EU, the trigger was 
tension with Russia over the fate of Transnistria.97 In 2003 Voronin rejected the so-
called Kozak memorandum, a Russian-sponsored proposal on the ‘frozen conflict’, 
which envisaged the creation of a federal state, whereby Transnistria could retain a 
veto power on virtually every national decision. Such a solution raised the 
government’s scepticism over Moscow’s commitment to meet Chisinau’s demands 
on Transnistria and the preservation of national unity and independence. Voronin 
realised that “Moscow was a greater threat to [his] power than Europe”,98 and he 
opted for closer relations with the EU and its reform agenda. 
Moreover, in the early-mid 2000s, the Communist government made instrumental 
use of the pro-EU/pro-Russia cleavage to anticipate and neutralise the risks 
connected with the ‘colour revolutions’ affecting neighbouring governments. The 
PCRM successfully prevented the opposition from growing in strength and cohesion 
on the wave of the massive uprisings in Ukraine, by hijacking an increasingly popular 
aspiration to reform through integration with the EU.99 In fact, the commitment to 
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undertake political reforms was more rhetorical than rooted in a firm will to 
democratise.100 
Being among the poorest countries in the EaP and highly dependent on external 
support,101 Moldova joined the ENP and subsequently the EaP in view of the promise 
of financial assistance and economic development. However, the two-term 
Communist government was able to resist the EU’s pressures to further open the 
political system and democratise by avoiding to completely alienate Moscow, 
which was perceived as an alternative partner to meet the needs of the country. 
According to Popescu and Wilson, “in order to deflect EU pressures for 
democratisation, the Communist government has sought to play Russia against the 
EU”.102 
Nevertheless, the inherent pluralism of the Moldovan political system meant not only 
that the strategies pursued by the government could be challenged by the 
opposition, but also that, differently from other post-Soviet countries, Moldova was 
more exposed to external pressures to democratise. 103  According to Popescu, 
“because Moldova is a much more open political system, the EU emphasised not 
only governance but also broader politics of democracy, whereas in Armenia it 
tended to focus more on technical matters”.104 
 
EU democracy promotion in Moldova 
Before the AA with the EU was signed in June 2014, 105  cooperation between 
Moldova and the EU was based on the 1994 PCA. Reproducing a template applied 
to the former Soviet Union countries, the PCA with Moldova included provisions on 
the respect of democratic principles and democratisation. In practice, before the 
launch of the ENP, this rhetorical commitment to democracy promotion was barely 
adhered to by the Union.106 
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A ‘window of opportunity’ appeared in the mid-2000s when the launch of the ENP 
coincided with the democratising wave of the ‘colour revolutions’ and the policy 
shift of the Communist government from a pro-Russian to a pro-Western stance. The 
ENP aimed to transform the Union’s neighbours into prosperous, secure and 
democratic countries. Yet, the place of democracy within the ENP has not always 
been clear-cut. The Action Plan jointly agreed with the EU in 2005 listed 
comprehensive democratic reforms among the priority objectives, including 
support to democratic institutions, the rule of law, free and fair elections, media 
freedom and freedom of expression, besides strengthening the administrative and 
judiciary sectors.107 However, the programming documents, including the NIP for the 
period 2007-2010, revealed that the actual focus of the Union was rather on sector-
specific measures pertaining more to ‘good governance’ and less to democracy, 
particularly on public administration and judiciary reform. 108  Although the NIP 
stressed the need to prioritise support to human rights and civil society, the deeper 
institutional dimension of democratic reform, involving freedom of the press, 
freedom of expression, constitutional checks and balances, was neglected.109 In 
addition, the document destined the bulk of funding to economic assistance and 
assigned €52.4-73.4 million (25-35% of total funds) to finance measures in the 
judiciary and public administration domains.110 
Admittedly, the Commission’s progress reports on the implementation of the Action 
Plan raised criticism on the deterioration of media pluralism and the separation of 
powers. 111  Moreover, in 2008, the EU Member States’ ambassadors in Chisinau 
voiced their reservations over the democratic nature of the Moldovan government 
which was showing authoritarian tendencies. 112  Nevertheless, the Communist 
government resisted the pressure for democratic reforms, notably by hinting at the 
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prospect of re-orienting the country’s relations towards Russia.113 Therefore, as long 
as the PCRM stayed in power, EU democracy promotion was mainly based on 
democratic governance, not only because of the Union’s focus on rather 
administrative and sector-specific reforms, but also in light of the government’s 
resistance to broader pressures for democratisation.  
After 2009-2010, when an outspoken pro-EU alliance won the contested elections 
and the EU launched the EaP, the promotion of democratic governance was 
complemented with increased attention for more intense linkages – through 
transnational platforms like EURONEST and the Eastern Partnership Civil Society 
Forum as well as by supporting the EED – 114 and for systemic-level issues such as the 
empowerment of parliament and constitutional checks and balances. The 
Commission launched a “Support Package for Democracy”115 and established a 
joint programme with the Council of Europe tackling essential democracy-related 
domains, including the constitutional separation of powers and media freedom.116 
Funding for democracy support under the 2011-2013 NIP increased to 35-40% out of 
a total of €273.14 million.117 
The renewed commitment to promote democracy beyond a governance-specific 
approach went along with the Moldovan government’s determination to advance 
further towards EU integration, boosted also by the incentives of the prospected 
DCFTA and visa liberalisation with the EU.118 In 2012 and 2013, under the ‘more for 
more’ approach, the progress on democratic reforms was rewarded with extra 
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funds of €28 million and €35 million respectively, thus rewarding Moldova as one of 
the best performers in the neighbourhood..119 
Nevertheless, the Italian Ambassador to the Republic of Moldova acknowledged 
that “while significant results have been achieved, the process of democratisation is 
far from being complete”.120 While the pro-EU government showed its intention to 
link political reforms to EU support, Moldova still needs stronger efforts to tackle 
corruption and ensure effective judiciary capacities.121 The government progressed 
on improving media freedom and it adopted anti-discrimination laws, however 
problems with their implementation persist. Moreover, the governing coalition 
suffered an internal crisis, which caused a loss of credibility.122 
On top of that, the European future of the country has been questioned by a strong 
Communist opposition, which is linking the domestic political battle to the increasing 
tension between the EU and Russia over the fate of the shared neighbourhood. This 
confrontation reflects the pro-EU/pro-Russia cleavage that constitutes one of 
Moldova’s issues of stateness, connecting domestic developments with external 
influence. In a country with 44% of the population supporting EU membership and 
45% in favour of accession to the Eurasian CU,123 “the PCRM has clearly opted for 
joining the CU with Russia”.124 
With the November 2014 elections approaching, the pro-Russian campaign of the 
PCRM sheds light on Russia’s role as a ‘black knight’, whose influence on Moldova’s 
politics can reduce the leverage and overall effectiveness of EU democracy 
promotion. Moscow’s ability to exert influence over the country derives also from 
another crucial problem of stateness faced by Moldova, the ‘frozen conflict’ with 
Transnistria.125 
In contrast to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the Transnistrian issue figures at the 
top of the priorities listed in the EU-Moldova Action Plan. 126  In addition, in 
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comparison with Armenia, EU support to Moldova’s democratisation is not framed 
as a threat to the survival of the state, but rather as leading to the re-composition of 
the country’s unity. Hence, the EU’s commitment to solve the Transnistrian stateness 
problem has provided it with room to promote democracy. With the ENP and the 
EaP, the EU has supported a long-term process of democratisation, which aims to 
make Moldova prosperous, stable, secure and ultimately more attractive to its 
breakaway region.127 
Hence, in spite of the geopolitical significance of the EaP, as declared by a 
Moldovan diplomat, the EU is perceived as behaving more “as a space of rules 
than as a geopolitical actor”.128 Mostly because of the Member States’ reluctance 
to cause a clash with Moscow, the EU generally opted for a softer approach to the 
resolution of the ‘frozen conflict’.129 Besides joining in 2005 the ‘5+2’ negotiations – 
gathering Moldova, Transnistria, Ukraine, the OSCE, Russia plus the United States and 
the EU as observers – and creating a Special Representative dealing with the 
matter,130 the EU’s approach included the promotion of democracy and aimed at 
“improving the attractiveness of right-bank Moldova to facilitate the resolution of 
the Transnistria issue”.131 
Hence, through the instruments of the ENP and the EaP – including the process 
leading to an AA and a DCFTA with the Union – the EU “focused on changing the 
context of the conflict”.132 In 2005 the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and 
Ukraine (EUBAM) was established in order to create incentives for the breakaway 
region to comply with Moldova’s customs regulations.133 This mission was coupled 
with an overall effort to support the economic development of the country and to 
make it a stable democracy. Such a “low-key”134 EU approach to conflict resolution 
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based on democracy promotion rested on a “conditionality-lite” 135 democratic 
leverage as well as on instances of linkages and governance. 
In comparison with the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh for Armenia, in the Moldovan 
case the promotion of democracy by the EU was not perceived as being in 
contrast with the resolution of the frozen conflict because the security situation 
between Moldova and Transnistria has not posed imminent threats: hence the 
possibility to experience a softer and long-term approach. 136  Moreover, in the 
Moldovan case, the EU could have a certain scope to promote democracy 
because Moldovans do not consider Transnistria to be a priority as important as EU 
integration. 137  Nevertheless, the Transnistrian problem of stateness has still the 
potential to amplify Russia’s influence in Moldovan politics, particularly in light of the 
pro-Eurasian rhetoric of the PCRM on the eve of the 2014 elections. 
 
The Russian factor 
The sources of Russian influence over Moldova are, in the first place, of an 
economic kind. Moldova is a member of the CIS and Russia is its second largest 
trade partner, accounting for 21.9% of total trade.138 The figure compares with a 
46.4% share of trade with the EU – the country’s first trade partner. 139  Russian 
investments account for 9%, 140  while approximately half of the FDI in Moldova 
originates from the EU.141 If Russia’s influence in Moldova’s economy has decreased 
over time,142 the country still relies on the Russian market for the export of crucial 
agricultural products – above all wine and fruit. Moldovan wine, which represents 
around 25% of the country’s agricultural exports,143 was already banned from Russia 
in the past, as it has been the case also for fruit.  
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A further lever that Russia can potentially use vis-à-vis Moldova is the significant 
number of migrant workers sending remittances from the Russian Federation. In 2012 
remittances accounted for approximately $1.6 million,144 representing roughly 25% 
of Moldovan GDP, 145  with almost 70% coming from Russia. 146  In 2013 between 
300.000 and 400.000 Moldovans were working in Russia.147 As nearly half of them do 
not fulfil the legal criteria for permanent residence in the Russian Federation, a 
selective enforcement of migration laws could hit both Moldovan workers and their 
remittances significantly.148 Admittedly, migratory outflows to the EU increased, also 
in light of the possibility for Moldovan citizens to obtain Romanian passports – in 2012 
an estimated 400.000 people held double Moldovan-Romanian citizenship. 149 In 
addition, as of April 2014, Moldovans were allowed visa free travel to Schengen 
countries for periods up to 90 days.150   
Another crucial source of Russian influence is Moldova’s dependence on Gazprom, 
which provides 100% of the country’s gas supplies. In addition, Gazprom controls a 
majority share in the national gas company MoldovaGaz, giving the Russian 
exporter a say in the management of gas infrastructures. 151  Gazprom has also 
demanded that the Moldovan government covers the $4 billion debts owed by the 
Transnistrian territories for gas deliveries.152 Hence, the country is exposed to pressure 
coming from Gazprom, which has increased after Moldova joined the Energy 
Community in 2010, thus pledging to import the energy acquis of the EU. 
The issues of stateness with which Moldova is faced – namely the Transnistrian 
‘frozen conflict’ and the ethno-political split between the supporters of pro-EU or 
pro-Eurasian integration – give further scope to Russia to exert influence on 
domestic politics. While formally being a mediator in the resolution of the conflict, 
Russia in fact provides political and economic support to Tiraspol. 153  Russia 
maintains its own peacekeeping forces in the region, which are considered to 
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contribute to the survival of the breakaway government. 154  The Russian 
engagement with Transnistria has another political implication in a way that it 
upholds a non-democratic regime serving as an alternative model of governance, 
specifically a model inspired by the “sovereign democracy”155 narrative and able 
to resist Western pressures. 
The other issue of stateness, namely the cleavage involving the Romanian-speaking 
groups, on the one hand, and the Russian-speaking groups, on the other, is mirrored 
in the political competition between pro-EU and pro-Russian parties.156 Currently, 
the opposition PCRM has resorted to a pro-Eurasian rhetoric and sought Moscow’s 
support not only to hinder the process of EU integration, but also to capitalise on the 
preference of nearly half of the population for the Russian-sponsored CU.157 The 
emerging polarisation between those favouring EU integration and those 
advocating closer ties with Russia is further exacerbated by the vocal support for 
Eurasian integration coming from the ethnic minority living in Gagauzia – an 
autonomous region in southern Moldova and of Russian/Turkish language.158  
Therefore, although Moldova’s competitive political environment has meant 
increased exposure to EU democracy promotion, and in spite of the reform 
momentum triggered by the support of the incumbent government for EU 
integration, this process can be halted by rising anti-EU domestic politics with 
Russian backing. The possibility to resist EU democracy promotion through 
rapprochement with Moscow was already experienced when the PCRM was in 
power. Hence, given the Communist Party’s outspoken preference for Eurasian 
integration, the November 2014 elections could impact on EU democracy 
promotion to the extent that a future turn to Russia may reduce the Union’s 
leverage to support political reforms. 
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Conclusion: “It’s not all Russia’s fault”159 
 
The recent annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Eastern Ukraine threaten 
Europe’s security and peace, with the relationships between Washington and 
Brussels, on the one hand, and Moscow, on the other, at a nadir. Russia is perceived 
with increasing wariness by Western capitals, amid talks about a “Cold War II”.160 
The risks generated by this volatile and explosive situation are enormous. The ENP 
and the EaP were expected to bring security, prosperity and stability to the eastern 
neighbourhood through a long-term strategy based also on democracy promotion. 
However, the news coming from Ukraine’s east bluntly contradict the rhetoric of the 
Union’s neighbourhood policy. In a region where hard security concerns have 
become of primary importance, the long-term promotion of democracy might be 
eclipsed. 
This paper tried to understand to what extent EU democracy promotion in the 
eastern neighbourhood is undermined by Russia. I argued that Russia can act as a 
‘black knight’, undermining EU democracy promotion by supporting domestic 
resistance to democratisation. The form and effectiveness of EU democracy 
promotion are shaped by a triangular relationship between the third country, the 
Union and Russia, whereby domestic actors are decisive players. External influence 
on domestic processes of democratisation is thereby activated through the filter of 
contested stateness in the form of unresolved conflicts or on-going ethno-political 
tensions. 
In the case of Armenia, the EU succeeded in promoting external democratic 
governance, that is, reforms at the sectoral level, but failed to address systemic 
democratic flaws. The limited effectiveness of EU democracy promotion was due to 
the reduced influence exerted by the European Union over Armenia’s most sensitive 
needs, notably concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and national security. 
The threats posed by the ‘frozen conflict’ engendered an aversion to potentially 
destabilising democratic openings. Russia’s influence undermined EU democracy 
promotion insofar as it strengthened the Armenian government’s resistance to 
democratisation. 
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As far as Moldova is concerned, the country’s “pluralism by default”161 significantly 
contributed to make it more open to external democracy promotion. Nevertheless, 
the country has been exposed to Russia’s leverage, including in the economic and 
energy domains. Moreover, Russia is actively engaged in the Transnistrian issue, one 
of Moldova’s problems of stateness together with the cleavage between, on the 
one hand, Moldovans that support Eurasian integration and, on the other hand, 
those that see the future of their country with, or even in, the EU. These are divisions 
that allow Russia’s presence to crowd out the EU’s leverage to promote political 
reforms. At the same time, Moldova’s inherent political pluralism and the absence 
of hard security threats coming from Transnistria have provided the EU with room to 
promote democracy, notably as a way to favour conflict resolution in the long 
term. However, the EU’s capacity to induce democracy-oriented reforms risks being 
reduced with the November 2014 elections, especially should tensions in Transnistria 
grow as a result of the Ukrainian crisis. 
The form and effectiveness of EU democracy promotion in the eastern 
neighbourhood can be hindered by Russia’s policies and actions in the area. But 
the ‘black knight’ Russia is not the only determinant of the limited impact of EU 
democracy promotion. As shown in the Armenian and Moldovan cases, Russia’s 
influence strengthens and supports domestic aversion to democratisation and EU 
pressure. Therefore, it is necessary to stress the importance of the triangular 
interaction between domestic factors, the EU and Russia when evaluating EU 
democracy promotion in the EaP. 
The triangular relation image is valuable to the analysis of political processes taking 
place in the shared neighbourhood. Faced with a growing Manichean discourse on 
the relations between the EU and Russia, the image allows for a nuanced appraisal 
of the dynamics and events that challenge security in the EaP region. Hard security 
concerns can take the priority over long-term democratic aspirations. This holds true 
also for the EU, which is now confronted with threats at its borders and must work to 
maintain peace. The difficult trade-off between democracy promotion and security 
interests in the short-term may reveal that the EU is no “white knight”. 162 
Guaranteeing peace and security is a vital objective, and this requires coming to 
terms with an influential and assertive Russia. Moscow’s readiness to make use of 
‘hard power’ in order to preserve and enhance its influence in the post-Soviet 
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space can be interpreted as a muscular way of responding to the EU’s EaP, which is 
underpinned by a long-term strategic vision linking regional security to 
democratisation. Yet, while the need to address urgent security needs might 
reduce consistency in democracy promotion in the short term, the EU should not 
lose sight of the ultimate objectives of the EaP: turning a blind eye to the demands 
for democracy, governmental accountability and freedom coming from its 
neighbourhood would further complicate the attainment of long-lasting and 
sustainable security. 
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